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Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-37-8(1) and (2) as amended.
See Appendix A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant-Appellant

was

charged

with

distribution

of

a

controlled substance, a second degree felony. The matter was filed
before the Second District Court, in and for Davis County.

A

change of venue was sought and granted, venue b€>.ing changed to
Judge Pat Brian, Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County.
The case was set for trial on February 6, 1989.

Prior to that

time, Defendant-Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence and
properly noticed that Motion for hearing on January 20, 1989. See
Appendix B.

This Motion to Suppress was thereafter continued by

the Court's own motion until February 6, 1989, immediately prior
to the beginning of trial.

This Motion to Suppress was denied by

the Court, a jury selected and trial begun on February 6, 1989.
The trial lasted for three days ending on February 8, 1989 with a
jury verdict finding the Defendant-Appellant guilty of a second
degree felony, distributing a controlled substance.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Davis Metro Narcotics Task Force was conducting a series of
controlled buys from Kevin and Kathy Gartrell, through the use of
a confidential informant.

Record at 19-32, 35-44.
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Pursuant to

surveillance of Kathy Gartrell during a controlled buy on March 30,
1988 with said informant, she was followed to a West Valley City
neighborhood from her home in Farmington.
As

Kathy

Gartrell

pulled

into

Record at 47, 133-135.

this

West

Valley

City

neighborhood, Officer Rapp, who was following her, drove past the
neighborhood so as not to raise suspicions. Record at 135. In the
meantime, Officer Brian, who had lost observation, was attempting
to catch up to the suspect. When Officer Brian arrived at the West
Valley City neighborhood, it had been several minutes since the
suspect had last been observed.

Officer Brian first noticed the

suspect's car parked in front of a duplex. Record at 48. He drove
past the duplex, down the street and into the driveway of a vacant
house so as to inconspicuously observe the duplex.

Record at 49.

During this period of time, which was about 20 minutes, Officer
Brian noticed at least three different vehicles come and go from
the duplex, however, he was not able to identify any of those
people nor did he see which side of the duplex they entered.
Because of this poor vantage spot, Officer Brian changed locations
to directly east of the duplex so that he could better observe the
front of the duplex.

Record at 49.

Thereafter, Kathy Gartrell exited the duplex and proceeded to
return to her home in Farmington, presumably to meet the informant
and complete the drug transaction.

Record at 53.

At no time

during this observation, did any of those officers involved observe
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Defendant-Appellant at the premises*

Record at 76.

Officer Rapp followed the suspect the entire way back to
Farmington, where she pulled into her driveway, entered her home,
returned to the vehicle and obviously noticed his surveillance.
Officer Rapp, upon being noticed by the suspect, drove off and did
not see her again until she was arrested at the Centerville offramp.

This gap in surveillance was at least five to ten minutes,

if not longer.

Record at 153-155.

In fact, the only other

information as to Kathy Gartrell's whereabouts is from Les Dowdle,
who testified that as she drove away from her home, it appeared
that she had gone into the municipal parking lot, although he was
not sure that she had.

Record at 198.

At the time of her arrest, Kathy Gartrell was found to possess
a controlled substance and triple-beam scales.

Record at 55-56,

155-156.
Based on these events, Officer Brian sought a search warrant
on the West Valley City duplex at 3216 South 2050 West.
57.

Record at

In his affidavit for a search warrant, (See Appendix C) ,

Officer

Brian

failed

to

mention

significant

gaps

in

the

surveillance of the suspect, as well as many intervening situations
which leave much doubt as to where, and between whom, illegal
activity took place (i.e., the gap in surveillance when suspect
entered the West Valley City neighborhood,

the large gap in

surveillance when she observed Officer Rapp following her, and the
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entry and exit of at least three (3) other persons into the duplex
during the time suspect was there.) Record at 76-77.
The search warrant was issued by Layton Circuit Court Judge
Taylor.

See Appendix D. It was executed on 3216 South 2040 West,

West Valley City on the evening of March 30, 1989. A large number
of items were seized, including currency, paraphernalia, a drivers
license, and utility bills.
158, 160.

Record at 140, 142, 144, 147, 148,

In fact, utility bills, as seized, show at least one

other male, and possibly a female as sharing occupancy of that
duplex with Defendant-Appellant.

Record at 160.

Based on these above events, Defendant-Appellant was charged
with distribution of a controlled substance. He reasonably sought
hearing on a Motion to Suppress on January 20, 1989. See Appendix
B.

This was continued for hearing until February 6, 1989.

Transcript of Motion to Suppress title page.

See

That hearing was

rapidly pushed so the jury trial could begin. Transcript of Motion
to Suppress at 58, 198, 117, 122.
The jury trial was held.

At that trial additional evidence

was entered before the trier-of-fact.

Evidence, in the form of a

photograph, was entered to show the obvious street sign "2040 West"
immediately in front of the actual premises searched.

Record at

84. (Photograph is Defendants Exhibit D.)
Also at trial, alleged eyewitness testimony of the course of
events within the duplex while Kathy Gartrell was there, show that
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no exchange was made, that no drugs were given to Kathy Gartrell.
Record at 122.

Despite evidence of a circumstantial nature only,

Defendant-Appellant was convicted of distribution of a controlled
substance, a second degree felony.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1*

The trial court's continuance of Defendant's Motion to

Suppress substantially impaired preparation of defense at trial.
The strategy of defense initially was to determine the Court's
stance with regards to admissibility of evidence seized pursuant
to a search warrant.

In so determining this stance, defense

counsel at trial made every reasonable effort to have the Motion
to Suppress heard more than two weeks before trial. Because of the
continuance,

Defendant-Appellant

was

denied

opportunity

to

adequately prepare defense against much of the evidence. Also, the
Court

impaired

its

own

objectivity

immediately prior to a jury trial.

by

forcing

the

hearing

By virtue of the fact that a

jury panel had been called, and was waiting, the Court became more
worried about seeing a jury selected than about the rights of
Defendant-Appellant.
2. Statements made by the Affiant in the affidavit for search
warrant were shown to be false in both the hearing on the Motion
to Suppress and at trial.

Such statements when r€>.moved from the

affidavit, or reformed to fit the actual observations of the
Affiant clearly show that there was no conclusion of probable cause
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upon which a search warrant could be issued upon the duplex. This
lack of probable cause arises from gaps in surveillance, as well
as the observation of many intervening people and opportunities
wherein drug transactions could reasonably have taken place.
3,

The address actually searched, wherein circumstantial

evidence was obtained with regards to Defendant-Appellant was not
the residence upon which a search was authorized.

All documents

supporting the search warrant, and including the search warrant
stated the address of 3216 or 3218 South 2050 West.

From evidence

seized at the actual premises searched, the search was conducted
upon

3216

South

2040 West.

Where

this

incorrect

address,

specifically 2040 West versus 2050 West, is not a typographical
error, it casts a question of credibility upon the Affiant seeking
search warrant as to his reliability in observation, thus also
casting doubt as to probable cause for the search warrant.
4. Evidence produced at the trial of this matter did not show
any transaction or distribution of a controlled substance.

At

most, testimony

or

showed

a simple possession

of contraband

paraphernalia; at least, the evidence did not even show the
necessary nexus of control or dominion by Defendant-Appellant over
such contraband sufficient to even convict of a third degree
felony.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
CONTINUING, ON ITS OWN MOTION, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT•S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS TO THE SUBSTANTIAL DETRIMENT OF
7

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AT TRIAL*
The Trial Court continued Defendant-Appellant's Motion to
Suppress, by its own motion, from January 20, 1989 to the morning
immediately preceding Defendant-Appellantfs trial on February 6,
1989.

The issue herein is, whether such continuance by the Trial

Court is an abuse of its discretion which substantially harmed
Defendant-Appellant at trial? It is. See, State v. Creviston, 646
P.2d 750 (Utah 1982).
Matters of the continuance, when claimed ais error at the
appellate level, usually involve claims of the* Trial Court's
failure to grant a continuance which in some way deprives the
Defendant in his preparation for trial.

In this instance, the

appellate court is asked to view the Trial Court's continuance,
upon its own motion, as a substantial deprivation of DefendantAppellant in preparation for his trial.
Whether or not to continue a hearing or trial is a matter of
Trial Court discretion.

Existent case law is unified on the point

that this discretion of Trial Court is to be given wide berth by
the appellate review and "will not be reversed...absent a clear
abuse of that discretion."

Crevistonf at 752 (quoting, State v

Moosman, 542 P.2d 1093 (Utah 1975)).
that

"[a]buse

may

be

found

where

Creviston, goes on to say
a party

has

made

timely

objections, given necessary notice, and made reasonable effort to
have the trial date reset for good cause, Id at 752, (quoting
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Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977)).
Defendant-Appellant contends that since he had made reasonable
effort to set the hearing on his Motion to Suppress significantly
in advance of the time set for trial, he had thereby, in good
faith, attempted to obtain a ruling from the Trial Court with
regards to admissibility of the Statefs evidence against him.
had

done

this

to

protect

valuable

time

to

adequately

He
and

sufficiently prepare for his trial based on the evidence he could
then reasonably suspect to be produced at trial. The Trial Court,
by use of its authority, then continued the hearing on DefendantAppellant's Motion to Suppress which effectively denied DefendantAppellant adequate preparation time for trial.

This denial, by

court action, was an abuse of the Trial Court's discretion, which
substantially impaired Defendant-Appellant's defense preparation,
forcing him immediately to proceed to trial to contend with
evidence he had otherwise believed was inadmissible, and which he
would not need to counteract.
This differs significantly from a case where the trial court
may hear the Motion to Suppress but reserve ruling until time of
trial.

The difference being that defense counsel at trial would

have a strong indication of the trial court's concerns about the
evidence at question.

Knowing the court's concerns, said defense

counsel could then more adequately prepare to deal with the
evidence at time of trial.

For this very purpose, of having an
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indication of what evidentiary concerns would arise at trial,
defense counsel made every reasonable effort to have the Motion to
Suppress heard well in advance of trial in this matter.
Furthermore, the Trial Court impaired its own objectivity by
continuing the Motion to Suppress to a time immediately before
trial. Because a jury panel had already been called, the Court was
under self-imposed pressure to allow all evidence to stand as valid
under the search warrant and admissible, then allowing the jury to
attach weight and credibility as such evidence Wcis brought before
the trial.

Such action by the Court effectively undermined the

rules of evidence wherein the judge is, in fact, to decide issues
of validity and admissibility of evidence.

The Court should not

let factors of weight and credibility as might appear before the
jury affect its determination.

Such evidence as is invalidly

obtained and inadmissible should never reach the jury.
II. FALSE STATEMENTS BY AFFIANT IN THE AFFIDAVIT
FOR SEARCH WARRANT, WHEN EXCISED FROM THE AFFIDAVIT,
LEAVE NO BASIS FOR FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE UPON WHICH A
SEARCH WARRANT CAN BE GRANTED.
Circuit Court Judge Taylor, in reliance upon an Affidavit of
Officer Lon Brian, which affidavit contained* materially false
statements, issued a search warrant on a duplex in West Valley
City.

The basic question herein is, whether probable cause for

issuance of the search warrant existed, once materially false
statements were excised from that Affidavit?

It did not.

See

State v. Dorsey. 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986); State v. Nielson. 727
10

P.2d 188 (Utah 1986); See, e.g., State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127
(Utah 1987)? State v. Miller. 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah App. 1987).
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States sets
forth the

fundamental

right that people are to be

free of

unreasonable search and seizure, and that a warrant for any such
search and seizure is to be based upon probable cause. Article* I,
Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah also sets forth this right
as a matter of state law.
constitutes probable cause?

Yet, the question still remains, what
In State v. Dorsev, the Utah State

Supreme Court followed the United States Supreme Court in holding
that "[p]robable cause exists where the facts and circumstances
within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves
to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an
offense has been or is being committed." 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah
1986), (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76,
69 SCt. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L.Ed 1879 (1949)).

Further, in quoting

Brinegar, at 176, 69 SCt. at 1311, the Utah Supreme Court, in
Dorsey. at 1088, delineated mere suspicion from probable cause.
"The line between mere suspicion and probable cause...necessarily
must be drawn by an act of judgment formed in light of a particular
situation and with account taken of all circumstances."
In accord, Utah case law now resoundingly holds that the
sufficiency of affidavits for search warrant as to establishing
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probable cause upon which to issue a search warrant is based upon
a

"totality-of-the-circumstances" test.

See, e.g.,

State v.

Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987).
As part of that totality of circumstances test, relevant Utah
case law further holds that where false statements are found in the
Affidavit for a Search Warrant, such statements are to be excised,
then the remaining information in the affidavit is to be reviewed
to determine if the remaining information establishes probable
cause. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah App. 1987).
Upon review, if the affidavit, with false statements excised, fails
to support the previous finding of probable cause, then any
evidence obtained under the improperly issued warrant must be
suppressed.

State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986).

In the instant case, two key statements in the Affidavit for
the Search Warrant, upon which probable cause was established in
issuing the search warrant are false.

The first false statement

is found at paragraph 8 of the affidavit. See Appendix C. Therein
Affiant states that he observed the suspect the entire time, from
the suspect's own residence in Farmington to the West Valley City
duplex.

In fact, the Affiant's trial testimony was that the

suspect's vehicle was not under surveillance for several minutes
upon entering the neighborhood in West Valley, and that no one
observed the suspect leave her car, nor did any one observe which
residence she entered, of many possible choices, upon arrival in
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that neighborhood.
The

suspect

referred

Appellant's sister-in-law.

to

is

Kathy

Gartrell,

Defendant-

It was suspected that she purchased a

controlled substance from someone at the residence in West Valley
City.

However, with intervening lapses in surveillance, coupled

with Officer Brianfs testimony that many people came and went while
Mrs. Gartrell was in the duplex residence area, there is nothing
more than mere suspicions that she purchased from a resident of the
duplex. A man of reasonable caution would not be able to conclude
that a resident of that duplex was the supplier, rather the comings
and goings of several people, destroys any assuredness inasmuch as
any of such people could have arrived at the duplex with a
controlled substance and made an exchange with Mrs. Gartrell.
The second, and equally significant, false statement was that
found in paragraph 15 of the Affidavit for Search Warrant.
Appendix C

See

The content of the affidavit statement, attributed to

Officer Paul Rapp, was that he observed the suspect leave her home,
go to a parking lot for a short while, then enter southbound 1-15
traffic.

Officer Rapp's sworn testimony differed greatly.

He

testified that his surveillance had been spotted by the suspect as
she stood in the driveway to her home in Farmington upon her
arrival there from West Valley City.

Upon being so noticed,

Officer Rapp drove off and did not see suspect for five to ten
minutes or even longer, until the time when suspect was apprehended
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on the Centerville off-ramp. In fact, during this period of time,
suspect was not under surveillance at all by task force officers.
These two gaps in surveillance, coupled with the blatant fact
that no one knew whether or not the suspect originally carried the
drugs from her own residence in the first place, ccist considerable
doubt upon any imagined probable cause that the drugs were bought
by the suspect from someone at the residence alleged to be the
residence as occupied by Defendant-Appellant.

Once these false

statements are removed from the affidavit for a search warrant, and
once omitted statements of actual observation are put into the
affidavit for search warrant, the affidavit fails to be sufficient
upon which to base a finding of probable cause for the issuance of
the search warrant. Such being the case, nearly all circumstantial
evidence mustered to tie Defendant-Appellant to the duplex and as
used to convict Defendant-Appellant of the underlying charge is
tainted by the improperly issued warrant, and should have been
suppressed prior to trial.
III. THE SEARCH AT ADDRESS 3216 OR 3218 SOUTH 2040
WEST WAS AN ILLEGAL SEARCH IN THAT ALL DOCUMENTS
AUTHORIZING A SEARCH DID SO FOR ADDRESS 3216 OR 3218
SOUTH 2050 WEST.
The Affidavit for Search Warrant and the Search Warrant
itself, both clearly specify and authorize search on the address
of 3216 or 3218 South 2050 West, West Valley City.

The address

which was actually searched in this matter was 3216 South 2040 West
in West Valley City.

The issue here is, where the address upon
14

which a search warrant is sought and issued is not typographically
in error, yet the actual premises searched is of a different
address, is the actual search illegal? It is. Cf. State v. Kelly,
718 P.2d 385 (Utah 1986).
Utah case law generally allows the validity of searches to
stand where incorrect street numbers are given in the affidavit or
on the face of the search warrant. Usually validity is maintained
because the incorrect numbers have arisen from typographical error
and the correct address is found in some of the supporting
documents.

In Kelly, 718 P.2d at 392, the warrant specified an

incorrect street number.

The Utah Supreme Court overlooked this

error in the warrant because the correct address appeared in the
attached affidavit.

That Court then went on to say, "considering

that the correct address appeared on the attached affidavits as
well as on the other warrants and corresponding affidavits, the
defect was minimal."
In the instant matter, on all available documents, including
the affidavit for search warrant and the search warrant itself,
the address to be searched was consistently specified as 3216 or
3218 South 2050 West, West Valley City. From utility bills seized
to show residency, a utility bill in the name of Gregg Taylor shows
the address of the premises actually searched to be 3216 South 2040
West, West Valley City.
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The error here does not lie with the officer's unsureness as
to whether it was 3216 or 3218 South, the significant error is that
2040 West was searched when only 2050 West was authorized to be
searched.

Perhaps the most disturbing fact is the street sign

showing 2040 West which stands directly in front of the actual
premises which was searched. Since there appears to be no evidence
that the incorrect address on the search warrant was a minor
technical flaw, the logical conclusion is that the reliability of
the officer swearing the affidavit is somewhat in (juestion, as well
as the officer's suspicions of any particular residence. Had this
factor been brought before the magistrate issuing the search
warrant, it is questionable as to whether the reliability of the
underlying statements would have sufficed for a finding of probable
cause upon which said search warrant was issued.
IV.
EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
CONVICT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT OF DISTRIBUTION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY.
At trial of this matter in the district court, much evidence
was introduced to the trier of fact.

There was conflicting

evidence as to who was in residency at the duplex which was
searched.

There was much evidence concerning the task force's

controlled buys from Kevin and Kathy Gartrell.

There was no

credible evidence established that involved Defendant-Appellant in
the sale of drugs, and as well the evidence conclusively failed to
tie Defendant-Appellant to any drug transactions or possession.
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Thus, the relevant issue, whether evidence produced at trial is
insufficient so that reasonable minds could entertain a reasonable
doubt that Defendant-Appellant was guilty of distribution of a
controlled substance, a second degree felony?
insufficient to sustain the conviction.

The evidence is

Utah Code Annotated, 58-

37-8(1), as amended; State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987).
The unlawful act which Defendant-Appellant is accused, and
convicted, of is distribution of a controlled substance, Utah Code
Annotated, 58-37-8(1), as amended. This prohibited act presupposes
that Defendant-Appellant distributed a controlled substance.

No

evidence was produced at trial to show distribution, or ancillary
distributive activities, i.e., agreeing, consenting, offering, or
arranging to distribute controlled substances.

The only direct

evidence offered at trial throughout the testimony of Witness Mori
was that said witness observed a substance, which he believed to
be cocaine, being cut and weighed.

This witness also testified

that he "didn't see him [Defendant-Appellant] actually give her
[Kathy Gartrell] anything ... ." Record at 103, lines 20-22.

Even

allowing this witness the benefit of the doubt as to credibility
before the trier of fact, and weighing all reasonable inference
from evidence produced at the trial, the only possible prohibited
act participated in by Defendant-Appellant was simple possession
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony.
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Further on the issue of insufficiency of evidence, evidence
produced at trial as to Defendant-Appellant's exclusive dominion
of residency is inconclusive as to establishing nexus between him
and illegal activity.

Utah case law regarding sufficiency of

evidence issues basically holds that mere suspicions or indications
are insufficient nexus to tie an accused to an illegal activity.
Especially in drug cases, the prosecution must establish that:
[Controlled substances or other] contraband was found in
a place or under circumstances indicating that the
accused had the ability and the intent to exercise
dominion and control over it. The mere occupancy of a
portion of the premises where the drug is found cannot,
without more, support a finding of its knowing and
intentional possession by the accused. There must be
some additional nexus between the accused and the
contraband to show that the accused had th€* power and
intent to exercise dominion and control over it.
(footnotes omitted). State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132
(Utah 1987).
In the instant case, the prosecution failed to carry its
burden

of

establishing

nexus between

Defendant-Appellant

dominion over the duplex residence in West Valley City.

and

Evidence

which was shown at trial indicates names of other people living at
that address.

In fact, such evidence shows others as being

responsible for various utility and telephone Bills.

Reasonable

minds would necessarily have to entertain reasonable doubt that the
evidence produced at trial conclusively points out that DefendantAppellant was connected with paraphernalia and contraband as was
seized during the search.
Thus, no additional nexus exists between the Defendant18

Appellant and the contraband seized at the duplex to show he had
any power or intent to exercise dominion and control over any such
contraband.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, to wit: that the trial
court abused its discretion in continuing, on its own motion,
Defendant-Appellant1s Motion to Suppress until the morning shortly
before trial; and because the law enforcement officers lacked
probable cause upon which a search warrant could be issued making
the search at 3216 or 3218 South 2040 West an illegal search; and
further, because there was insufficient evidence upon which a
reasonable juror could
Defendant-Appellant

find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the

guilty

of

second

degree

felony

sales of

cocaine. Defendant-Appellant respectfully requests that the lower
court1s finding that the evidence obtained through the search
warrant as admissible be reversed and that this case be remanded
to the District Court, or in the alternative, be dismissed.
DATED this flfi

day of November, 1989.

David Paul White
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

19

58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties [Effective until July
1, 1990].
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person
to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances
listed in Schedules II through V except under an order or prescription; or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order or directly from a practitioner while acting in the course
of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place,
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present
where controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation
of this chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent,
and not concealed from those present; however, a person may not be
convicted under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not
use the substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else
to do so; any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances
by the defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section
78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring
the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of
pain or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled substance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person is
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect
to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of
a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce .but less than 16 ounces,
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility
as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2)(b).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection
(2)(b), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all
other controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or
(iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through
(2)(a)(vii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
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DIUMENTI & LINDSLEY
William H. Lindsley #1966
D. Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorneys for Defendant
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: 292-0447
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

vs.
TROY GARTRELL,

Case No.
Judge Pat Brian

Defendant.

Comes now defendant, by and through counsel, and respectfully moves!
the Court to suppress and exclude any and all evidence obtained pursuant tol
the search of the premises located at 3216 South 2040 West, West Valley City J
on the 30th day of March, 1988, pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth and Sixthj
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Rule 12 Utah Rules ofj
Criminal Procedure and Article 1, Sections 7, 12 and 14 of the Constitution of!
the State of Utah. This Motion is further based upon the following:
1 . That no lawful warrant

I

was issued or served for the search!

conducted upon premises which the defendant was an occupant of and/or entitled!
to the use and possession of, located at 3216 South 2040 West, in Salt Lak^I

County.

J
2. That any warrant the officers conducting the search had in theirl

possession was, first, not for those specific premises, secondly, was!
overbroad and vague, failing to describe with particularity the place to b I

searched or the things to be seized, and thirdly, that the issuance of such
was not based upon probable casue.
3. That the officers conducting the search were acting in bad faith
and in wilful disregard for the provisions of Federal and State law providing
for the protection of individual rights and security, and that particulary the
officers

sought a search warrant and included in an affidavit false or

misleading facts which they knew to be false or misleading, and that the same
officers concealed from the magistrate before whom they appeared relevant and
material facts which they knew might result in the magistrate not issuing the
warrant if such facts were known to the magistrate.
For example, the affiant observed one Kathy Gartrell enter a separate
residence wherein and about affiant observed another individual who affiant
identified

as a suspect in prior narcotics transactions, wherein it is

probable the transactions complained of herein could have occurred (instead of
the residence alleged by the prosection) which information was wilfully and
deliberately withheld from the magistrate,
WHEREFORE, defendant respectfully requests an evidentiary hearing
relative to this motion and an opportunity thereafter to submit legal argument
on facts then presented, and that all evidence obtained thereby be excluded
and suppressed*
Dated this / ^

J
day of January, 1989.

William n. Lindslev
Attorney for Defendant

NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that hearing attendant defendant's Motion his
been scheduled on Friday, January 20, 1989 at the hour of 1:30 p.m. or as soon
thereafter as counsel may be heard before the Honorable Pat Brian.
Dated this / J

day of January, 1989.

William H. Lindsley
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing this

jQ

day

of January, 1989, to Steve Majors, Deputy Davis County Attorney, Courthouse,
Farmington, Utah 8*1025.
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MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 4 51-3 2 27
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LAYTON DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT FOR
In Re: Search of the
apartment located in a
duplex described as the
East unit of the duplex
with an address of either
3216 or 3218 South 2050
West, West Valley City and
occupied by Troy Gartrell

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss:

SEARCH WARRANT

Before (, Circuit Court Judge, the
undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he has
probable cause to believe that on the premises which are
described as:
apartment located in a
duplex described as the
East unit of the duplex
with an address of either
3216 or 3218 South 2050
West West Valley City and
occupied by Troy Gartrell
there is now certain property described as:
Controlled Substances

Drug Paraphernalia
Records, accounts, books, pictures receipts or
other written material evidencing sales or
distribution of controlled substances
Monies, securities, currency or other items of
value used in the sale or distribution of
controlled substances
Identification cards, records, accounts books,
pictures, receipts, personal property or other
items evidencing ownership, occupation or
control of the above premises or rooms therein.

The facts to establish the issuance of this warrant are
as follows:
1.

That affiant is an investigator with the Davis Metro

Narcotic Task Force and is familiar with the facts presented
herein.
2.

That on or about the 29th day of March, 1988,

affiant made contact with

Confidential Informant at which

time, the Confidential Informant made a phone call to Kevin and
Cathey Gartrell at their home in Farmington.
3.

That at that time, Confidential Informant made

arrangements with Kevin and Cathey to purchase 1/4 ounce of
Cocaine such arrangements being that Confidential Informant would
deliver the money to Cathey Gartrell on the following day, and
she would then run to the home of her dealer, pick up the
cocaine and return it to Confidential Informant.
4.

That said conversation was recorded and monitored

by affiant.
5.

That on the 30th day of March, 1988, under the

supervision of affiant, Confidential Informant did then deliver a
sum of money to Cathey Gartrell as had been arranged.

6. That at the time the Confidential Informant gave
Cathey Gartrell the money, Confidential Informant requested that
she call Confidential Informant before she left her dealers home
and let Confidential Informant know whether she had obtained the
cocaine or not.
7.

That after the money was delivered, affiant and Paul

Rapp then followed the automobile driven by Cathey Gartrell into
the Salt Lake area.
8.

That affiant observed Cathey Gartrell drive directly

to a duplex located at 3218 South 2050 West, West Valley City,
Utah

and that affiant was able to observe her the whole way and

the only stop she made was at a gas station in Farmington, Utah
where she filled her car with gas.
9.

That upon arriving at the above address, affiant

observed Cathey's vehicle parked in the driveway of the above
described duplex and that this was 12:55 p.m.
10.

Statement from Officer Llyod Killpack that at 1:29

p.m. he monitored a phone call from Cathey
Gartrell to the Confidential Informant in which Cathey indicated
that she had obtained the cocaine and that she was on the way
back to deliver it to Confidential Informant.
11.

That at 1:56 p.m. affiant observed Cathey Gartrell

leave the east unit of the above described duplex and place a red
bag in the trunk of her car, and then enter
12.

her vehicle.

That affiant was unable to obtain the exact number

of the east unit but was able to observe that one unit was
number 3218 and one 3216.

13.

Statement from Officer Paul Rapp, that after Cathey

Gartrell entered her vehicle she then left the area and he
was again able to follow her directly back to her home in
Farmington without making any stops.
14.

Statement from Officer Lloyd Killpack that he was

maintaining survallence of Cathey Gartrell's home and observe^
her arrive at the home at which time she met briefly with a male
individual at which time she got back into her vehicle and left.
15.

Statement from Paul Rapp that he observed Cathey

Gartrell leave her home in Farmington and after stopping for a
short time in the parking lot of the Davis County Municipal Court
Building enter the 1-15 freeway heading south.
18.

That at that time, Cathey Gartrell's vehicle was

stopped in the area of Centerville and she was placed under
arrest.
19.

That a search of her vehicle was made incident to

arrest at which time a red bag was found in the trunk of her car
which- contained a set of scales and a baggie containing about 1/4
ounce of white powder which based on affiant experience and
training is believed to be cocaine.
20.

That also located in the vehicle was a large

quantity of marijuana.
21.

That after Cathey Gartrell was placed under arrest

she was advised of her miranda rights which she waived and
thereupon spoke with affiant.
22.
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a search warrant be issued

for the search of the above-described premises and the seizure of
any of the said items.

Affian^/'
Subscribed and sworn to me

r

zii* '
1988.
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MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 4 51-3227
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LAYTON DEPARTMENT

rHE STATE OF UTAH,

:
•

En Re: Search of an
ipartment located in a
luplex described as the
Cast unit of the duplex
/ith an address of either
1216 or 3218 South 2050
/est West Valley City and
>ccupied by Troy Gartrell

:OUNTY OF DAVIS

)

TATE OF UTAH

) ss:

SEARCH WARRANT
:
:
:

HE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF DAVIS:
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by
on Brian investigator with the Davis Narcotic Task Force, that
e has reason to believe that in the below-described premises
here are items which constitute evidence of the commission of a
rime.
YOU ARE THERE*

: COMMANDED in the daytime or the night

ime with out giving notice of your presence or intentions, to
*ke immediate search of the premises described as:
apartment located in a

duplex described as the
East unit of the duplex
with an address of either:
3216 or 3218 South 2050
West West Valley City and:
occupied by Troy Gartrell
and search for the following property:
Controlled Substances
Drug Paraphernalia
Records, accounts, books, pictures receipts or
other written material evidencing sales or
distribution of controlled substances
Monies, securities, currency or other items of
value used in the sale or distribution of
controlled substances
Identification cards, records, accounts books,
pictures, receipta^personal property or other
items evidencingrJ^wnFT^Hip9 occupation or
control of the ab«w-ppwnises or rooms therein.

\nd if you find the same or any part thereof to bring it
forthwith before me at the Circuit Court, County of Davis, or
retain such property in your custody subject to the order of this
:ourt.
Given under my hand and dated this

•tf*L.

1988.

day of

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered a true and
correct copy of Appellants Brief, to the following:
Dan Larsen
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
this i(jp

day of November, 1989.

David Paul White
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

